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EDITOR'S NOTE 
REFERRING TO FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: AN EPISODE IN THE CULTURE 
WARS 
Mark Tushnet is the Cannack Waterhouse Professor of 
Constitutional Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. He 
received his undergraduate degree magna cum laude from Harvard 
College in 1967. He received a J.D. and M.A. in history from Yale 
University in 1971. He clerked for Judge George Edwards and 
Justice Thurgood Marshall before beginning to teach at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School in 1973. In 1981 he moved 
to the Georgetown University Law Center. He has been a visiting 
professor at the University of Texas, University of Southern 
California, University of Chicago, Columbia University, New 
York University, and Harvard law schools. 
Professor Tushnet is the co-author of four casebooks, including 
the most widely used casebook on constitutional law, 
Constitutional Law (with Stone, Seidman, and Sunstein). He has 
written fourteen books, including a two-volume work on the life of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall and A Court Divided: The Rehnquist 
Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, and edited eight 
others. He has received fellowships from the Rockefeller 
Humanities Program, the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial 
Foundation, and has written numerous articles on constitutional 
law and legal history. He was President of the Association of 
American Law Schools in 2003. In 2002 he was elected a fellow 
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
Professor Tushnet presented a version of this speech at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law Center for International 
and Comparative Law's Annual Lecture on International and 
Comparative Law. His remarks offer a perspective on the 
interpretation of foreign law in the U.S. Supreme Court and 
address the speech given by The Honorable Peter J. Messitte, 
which can be found at 35 U. BALT. L. REv 171 (2005). 
REFERRING TO FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: AN EPISODE IN THE CULTURE 
WARS 
Mark Tushnett 
As Judge Messitte's essay demonstrates, I recent references in 
Supreme Court decisions to non-U.S. legal materials have 
generated a great deal of controversy. Those who make such 
references say that doing so is no big dea1.2 I have called the 
controversy a tempest in a teapot.3 My topic here is the disjuncture 
between the perception on one side that something important and 
troubling has happened--or, as I will argue, may be about to 
happen-and the perception on the other that there is nothing to be 
concerned about. After describing in Section I the practice that has 
given rise to the controversy, I examine in Section II one feature of 
the controversy that, I believe, has not yet been addressed in detail: 
The target of criticism is not really what Justices of the Supreme 
Court have done, but rather what they might do. I then argue that 
the fact that the target is an imagined practice rather than the real 
one is a clue to the nature of the controversy. The controversy, I 
conclude in Section III, is a skirmish in the ongoing culture wars 
over the courts. The claims made against and for references to 
non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation ought to be analyzed 
as cultural artifacts rather than as arguments, that is, in terms of the 
reasons given against and for the practice. 
t Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. I thank Mortimer Sellers for inviting me to give the lecture on 
which this Essay is loosely based, Eric Posner for suggesting the lines of 
argument I pursue here, and Martin Lederman for helpful comments. This Essay 
is a companion to Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing 
More?: Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. 
Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006), where some of the ideas touched on here are 
developed in more detail, and which touches on this Essay's primary topic. 
I. See Peter J. Messitte, Citing Foreign Law In u.s. Courts: 
Is Our Sovereignty Really At Stake?, 35 U. BALT. L. REv 171 (2005). 
2. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'y REv., June-
July 2005, at 4, available at http://www.policyreview.orgljun05/anderson.html 
(attributing phrasc to Justice Stephen Breyer). 
3. Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 
239,248 (2003). 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PRACTICE DESCRIBED 
Probably the most striking thing about the controversy is the 
large gap between what the Supreme Court has actually done-
rather little, as I will show-and the rather high level of concern 
and even outrage the Court's critics have expressed. The practice 
the critics focus on consists of somewhere between four and seven 
references to non-U.S. law, in a body of constitutional adjudication 
that runs thousands of pages. A simple enumeration of the 
references should be enough to motivate the remainder of my 
argument. The references fall into two categories: those by the 
Court, and those by individual Justices. I begin with the references 
to non-U.S. law in majority opinions. 
A. Atkins v. Virginia 
A footnote in Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion for the Court 
in Atkins v. Virginia, holding unconstitutional the practice of 
executing criminal defendants with mental retardation, stated: 
"Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders 
is overwhelmingly disapproved.,,4 This factual assertion followed 
references to purely domestic sources: the positions taken by U.S. 
"organizations with germane expertise" and by "representatives of 
widely diverse religious communities in the United States."s 
These materials were cited to support the proposition that decisions 
by U.S. legislatures "reflect[ed] a much broader social and 
professional consensus.,,6 After criticizing the majority's analysis 
of entirely domestic sources of law, Justice Scalia characterized the 
reference to the fact of disapproval within the world community as 
"the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus.",7 
He did not dispute the factual claim the Court made.8 
B. Lawrence v. Texas 
Lawrence referred to non-U.S. law for two purposes. The 
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick had said that the claim 
that there was a deeply rooted tradition protecting people's right to 
engage in consensual homosexual activity was "at best, 
facetious.,,9 Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion in 
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing Brief for The European 
Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina, 
533 U.S. 955 (2001) (No. 00-8727». 
5. /d. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
8. /d. at 347-48. 
9. 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Bowers asserted that "[ d]ecisions of individuals relating to 
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention 
throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and 
ethical standards. ,,10 
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Anthony Kennedy supported his 
claim that both assertions were overstated by referring to 
developments in u.s. law over the prior fifty years, to legislative 
developments in Great Britain, and to a 1981 decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) finding anti-sodomy 
laws to violate the European Convention on Human Rights. II That 
decision, Justice Kennedy wrote, showed the error in "the premise 
in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our 
Western civilization.,,12 The decision by the European Court 
showed, first, that Chief Justice Burger's assertions were too 
"sweeping," I 3 and, second, that the majority's conclusion in 
Bowers that "the claim . . . was insubstantial in our Western 
civilization" was erroneous. 14 The references to non-U.S. law 
were used to refute assertions in Bowers about the existence of 
consensus or substantial unanimity in the Western tradition-that 
is, essentially as evidence of facts about opinions in Western 
societies. 15 In this they resemble the reference in Atkins. 
C. Roper v. Simmons 
The decision invalidating the imposition of capital punishment 
on juvenile offenders contained the Court's most extensive 
discussion of non-U.S. law. 16 Earlier references amounted to no 
more than a few sentences in a Court opinion; Roper had an entire 
section devoted to non-U.S. law. 17 The Roper opinion had three 
sections of substantive analysis. 18 The first examined domestic 
law, and concluded that there was a trend in that law against the 
10. /d. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
11. 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003). 
12. Jd. at 573. 
13. Jd. at 572. 
14. Jd. at 573. The Bowers majority opinion did not specifically say that the claim 
there asserted was "facetious" in light of the history of Western civilization, but 
its reference to tradition makes Justice Kennedy's restatement at least a plausible 
one. 
15. For this reason, Ernest A. Young, author of Foreign Law and the Denominator 
Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 153 (2005), is mistaken in suggesting that the 
Court engaged in "sloppy opinion writing" in referring to the European Court's 
decision "merely ... [as a]fact" rather than for the reasons it contained. The 
very point was to note the decision as a fact. 
16. Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
17. Jd. at 574-78. 
18. ld. at 563-78. 
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imposItIOn of capital punishment on juvenile offenders. 19 The 
second contained the majority's own evaluation of the propriety of 
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders, in light of 
principles of deterrence, retribution, and criminal responsibility, an 
evaluation the Court asserted was required by precedent. 20 The 
third contained the references to non-U.S. law. 21 It began by 
asserting that the conclusions already reached in the prior sections 
"find[] confirmation" in practices elsewhere in the world.22 Those 
practices, the opinion noted, were not "controlling.,,23 The final 
words of the five paragraphs devoted to non-U.S. law reiterated 
these points: "The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions.,,24 
Now for the references in separate opinions by individual 
Justices. 
D. Printz v. United States 
The first significant reference to non-U.S. law in modem 
constitutional adjudication came in Justice Breyer's dissenting 
opmIOn in Printz v. United States.25 Against the majority's 
holding, as he interpreted the decision, that important values of 
federalism were better promoted by barring the national 
government from requiring state and local executive officials to 
devote resources to enforcing national law than by allowing the 
national government to so require, Justice Breyer pointed to the 
allocation of power in the German federal union and the quasi-
federal European Union.26 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
replied that reference to non-U.S. experience was perfectly 
appropriate when the Framers were writing the Constitution, but 
was inappropriate in interpreting the Constitution they wrote,z7 
19. Jd. at 563-67. 
20. Id. at 567-74. 
21. Id. at 574-78. 
22. Id. at 575. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 578. 
25. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
26. Id. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
The fedeml systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, 
for example, all provide that constituent states, not fedeml bureaucracies, 
will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees 
enacted by the central 'federal' body. They do so in part because they 
believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent 
authority of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary government, 
and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well. 
e citation omitted). 
27. Id. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion). 
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E. Knight v. Florida 
Justice Breyer also referred to non-U.S. sources in his dissent 
from the denial of certiorari in a case raising the question, is capital 
punishment unconstitutional when the statutes authorizing the 
penalty are administered in a manner that leads to extended stays 
on death row, with attendant psychological and physical 
consequences (the so-called "death row phenomenon")?S He 
observed that constitutional courts for Jamaica (that is, the Privy 
Council in Great Britain), India, Zimbabwe, and the European 
Union had held that the death row phenomenon amounted to 
inhumane treatment, while also noting that the Canadian Supreme 
Court had taken the contrary position.29 Although the non-U.S. 
decisions did not "bind" the U.S. Supreme Court, he wrote, "this 
Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in 
which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to 
our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable 
circumstances. ,,30 
F. Grutter v. Bollinger 
Opening her concurring opmlOn in the case involving the 
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law 
School, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that a majority agreed 
that its members expected that affirmative action programs would 
be unnecessary-and would perhaps become unconstitutional-at 
some point.3l This, she wrote, "accords with the international 
understanding of the office of affirmative action," citing a number 
of international agreements.32 She did not contend that the Court's 
limitation on the temporal scope of affirmative action programs 
was somehow compelled by international law, or even that the 
agreements to which she referred gave the majority some reason to 
adopt a temporal limitation.33 And, notably-given that critics of 
references to non-U.S. materials tend to be political conservatives 
who believe that affirmative action programs should be more 
broadly unconstitutional than the Court-the reference was in 
support of a limitation on affirmative action. It may be worth 
observing as well that Justice Ginsburg'S references to non-U.S. 
28. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). 
29. ld. at 995-96. 
30. Id. at 997. 
31. Grulter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The majority 
stated that their expectation was that affirmative action programs would be 
unnecessary in twenty-five years. !d. at 343 (majority opinion). 
32. ld. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
33. ld. at 344-45. 
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law here undennine the claims sometimes made that such 
references are always in the service ofliberal positions?4 
Having followed the controversy rather closely, I am confident 
in asserting that the foregoing is a comprehensive list of the 
controversial instances of recent Supreme Court references to non-
U.S. law.35 It is obviously a very short list. Some of the 
references--clearly those in Atkins and Grutter, and less clearly in 
Lawrence-are merely mentions of facts about the state of the law 
outside the United States. The philosophers' distinction between 
mention and use seems relevant here: These references mention 
non-U.S. law, but do not use it in support of some proposition 
about U.S. constitutional law. The difference can be seen in 
Justice Scalia's criticism of the reference to opinions of the world 
community in Atkins.36 Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion that 
the majority used the facts about world-wide opinion "to fabricate 
'national consensus,,,,37 the majority mentioned those facts as an 
indication that the national consensus it found in domestic sources 
was supported by professional organizations, religious 
organizations, and national governments elsewhere. The Court's 
evaluation of the national consensus revealed in domestic sources 
showed U.S. legislatures were not out of tune with other groups. 
This is true as well with the confinnatory references to non-U.S. 
law in Roper.38 
Sometimes, of course, the references to non-U.S. law signal 
genuine disagreement about constitutional interpretation. This is 
clearly so in Printz. Justice Breyer thought that the interpretation 
of the U.S. Constitution could be infonned by experience 
elsewhere, which, he wrote, might "cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem ... 
,,39 Justice Scalia's response was predicated on the view that 
consequences were irrelevant, or at least not important enough, in 
34. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional 
Comparativism, 52 UCLA 1. REV. 639, 702 (2005) (describing the possibility that 
reliance on non-U .S. law would lead to the adoption of non-liberal results). 
35. In Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002), in dissenting from a denial of 
certiorari, Justice Breyer reiterated his concerns about the death row 
phenomenon, again citing non-U.S. decisions. In Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 
(1995), in a memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens 
observed that "the highest courts in other countries have found arguments 
[regarding the death row phenomenon) persuasive." Justice Stevens also noted 
an opinion by two English judges asserting that execution after long delay would 
violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Bill of Rights 
of 1689, which was, according to Justice Stevens, "the precursor of our own 
Eighth Amendment." Id. 
36. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. 
38. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence. Resistance. 
Engagement, 119 HARV. 1. REv. 109, 115-16 n.30 (2005). 
39. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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determining what our Constitution means.40 Here, though, the 
controversy ought to be about the underlying theory of 
constitutional interpretation, not about the references to non-U.S. 
law, which are only one of many ways in which a Justice might 
import consequences into the interpretive task. 
Criticism of the more extensive references to non-U.S. law in 
Roper seems to rest on the proposition that the Court did not mean 
what it said. The thought appears to be that the references were 
too extensive to be mere confirmation of a judgment already 
reached.41 More elaborately: Critics find the Court's assertions 
about the existence of a trend in domestic law and practice 
unpersuasive, and disagree with the proposition that precedent 
authorized the Justices to make their own independent judgment 
about questions of deterrence, retribution, and criminal 
responsibility. So, the argument seems to be, the only thing that 
could possibly have supported the majority's conclusion was non-
U.S. law. On this view, the m~ority actually relied on, and did not 
merely refer to, non-U.S. law. 2 The difficulty with this criticism 
is that it is cogent only if the majority itself actually accepted the 
criticisms of its own analysis, which is, to say the least, highly 
unlikely. 
I hope that this enumeration demonstrates how modest the 
actual practice of referring to non-U.S. law is. The next section 
examines whether the target of criticism is not the actual practice 
but some practice that might develop out of it, and concludes that, 
if so, the criticisms remain ill-founded. 
II. FEAR OF THE FUTURE 
Close reading of the critical literature on references to non-U.S. 
law reveals that no one criticizes what the Justices have actually 
done. Instead, the critics treat what the Justices have done as 
foreshadowing more extensive uses of, and reliance on, non-U.S. 
law in future cases. The actual practice, that is, appears to be 
immune from criticism, but some extensions of that practice might 
well be mistaken-and, the critics suggest, might be forthcoming 
40. Jd. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion). 
41. See. e.g .. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 343-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court was fabricating a national consensus by relying on non-U.S. law, not 
finding persuasive the Court's assertions about the trends in domestic law, and 
concluding that the non-U.S. material must have played a larger role than the 
majority's modest treatment of that material suggested). 
42. Cf Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 90 
(2005) (in discussing Roper, referring to "the psychological literature that it 
misused, . . . [and] the national consensus that it concocted"); Young, supra 
note IS, at 155 (referring to "the exceptionally weak evidence of domestic 
consensus and the Court's close division on the objective morality component" in 
Roper). 
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unless the existing practice is beaten back.43 What the Justices 
have done, on this view, is something like a baby in the crib, which 
might grow into something threatening and should be strangled 
right away.44 
The first part of this criticism is obviously correct. Were a 
Justice to say, "The ECHR has decided this precise question, and I 
regard that decision as a binding precedent," the Justice would 
have acted in a manner completely insupportable within the U.s. 
constitutional tradition.45 Even treating the ECHR decision as a 
relevant precedent would be a jurisprudential mistake. Precedent 
matters when there are reasons arising from the deciding court's 
position in a judicial hierarchy, and independent of the merits of 
the arguments the court provides, for adhering to the deciding 
court's conclusion. But, again obviously, the ECHR-and indeed 
nearly all non-U.S. adjudicatory bodies--does not stand in the 
hierarchical relation to the U.S. courts that the concept relevant 
d . 46 prece ent reqUIres. 
So, the critics' concern has force only if there is some reason to 
think that a practice, currently defensible, might tum into one that 
is indefensible.47 This is essentially a standard slippery slope 
argument, and as Professor Eugene Volokh has shown, such 
arguments make sense only when we can describe some 
mechanism that would lead someone to infer from a defensible 
practice that it is permissible to engage in an otherwise 
indefensible one.48 
43. See. e.g., Young, supra note 15, at 154 (describing what "at least in theory" 
might be done with references to non·U.S. law). 
44. To extend the metaphor, what the Justices have actually done is not a mature 
practice. 
45. Again, the obvious point is that the ECHR has jurisdiction over claims arising out 
of a treaty to which the United States is not a party, and its interpretation of that 
treaty cannot bind any U.S. actor, including the Supreme Court, as the U.S. actor 
interprets the U.S. Constitution. 
46. Nor, of course, have any of the references to non-U.S. law treated that law as 
relevant precedent in the jurisprudential sense. 
47. One version of the concern about what lies at the bottom of the slope is 
"political." Conservatives fear that liberals will be able to refer to decisions from 
high-prestige foreign courts, like the British House of Lords and the European 
Court of Human Rights, while they will have to cite low-prestige ones, perhaps 
the courts of China and the Sudan. If so, the shadow-effects of differential 
prestige will hclp their opponents even if conservatives do start referring to non-
U.S. law. It is not clear to me, though, that the predicate of this argument is 
factually accurate. There are, I think, plenty of "conservative" decisions from 
high-prestige foreign courts, including the German Constitutional Court and, on a 
range of issues, the European Court of Human Rights. I thank Eric Posner for 
suggesting that I address this question. 
48. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. 
L. REv. 1026, 1030-32 (2003) (analyzing how to "sensibly evaluate the risk of 
slippery slopes"). 
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Professor Volokh describes the structure of the slippery slope in 
this way: You and I agree that some practice A (referring to non-
U.S. law, for example) is defensible, but I believe that another 
practice B (relying on non-U.S. law, for example) is indefensible 
or undesirable.49 You might now agree with me about that as well, 
but I believe that if you engage in practice A by referring to non-
U.S. law, you are more likely to end up thinking that practice B 
(relying on non-U.S. law) is defensible or desirable.5o So T want to 
stop you, and me, from engaging in referring to non-U.S. law. 
Clearly, as Professor Volokh demonstrates, the key here is figuring 
out why judges who defensibly refer to non-U.S. law are, as a 
result of that practice, more likely to indefensibly rely on non-U.S. 
law. 
Professor Volokh identifies six mechanisms by which that 
outcome can come about.51 In the present context, only one seems 
to me even plausible: Referring to non-U.S. law "may change 
people's attitudes about the propriety of' relying on non-U.S. 
law.52 Professor Volokh observes, correctly, that this mechanism 
"is connected to expressive theories of law."s3 That, in turn, 
provides a general reason to be skeptical about arguments that we 
will get on a slippery slope because the attitude-changing 
mechanism will take hold: Expressive theories are quite dubious 
as accounts oflaw and its social operation. 54 
Even putting that general skepticism to one side, I find the 
attitude-changing mechanism implausible in the context of 
precedent rather than policy.55 The problem is that precedents 
come inextricably packaged with reasons, explicitly offered rather 
49. See id. at 1028. 
50. See id. at 1028, 1031-34 ("Slippery slopes may occur even when a principled 
distinction can be drawn between decisions A and 8."). 
51. ld. at 1033-34. 
52. ld. at 1033 (emphasis omitted). The other mechanisms Professor Volokh 
describes are: engaging in the new practice "may be seen as a small enough 
change that people will reasonably ignore it" but, when taken together with other 
similar changes might lead people to think that relying on non-U.S. law is 
defensible; engaging in the new pmctice will create "political momentum" or 
reduce the political power of opponents; doing so will lower the cost of the 
undesirable practice; and doing so might trigger other rules that make the 
undesirable practice easier to engage in. ld. at 1033-34. 
53. ld. at 1036. 
54. For" general critique of expressive theories of law, see Matthew Adler, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 
(2000). 
55. Notably, the standard example of attitude changing involves the adoption of anti-
smoking policies, which are said to induce people to change their view of the 
desirability of smoking cven in settings not covered by the policies. For 
Professor Volokh's reference to this example, see Volokh, supra note 48, at 
1036. 
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than implicit in the very adoption of the practice.56 So, in the 
context of legal reasoning, the slippery slope must occur under the 
following circumstances. A judge refers to non-U.S. law. The 
judge offers good reasons for the reference, understands that those 
reasons are not available to defend a practice of relying on non-
U.S. law, and understands as well that there are other good reasons 
that make relying on non-U.S. law indefensible. Time passes, and 
the very fact that the judge referred to non-U.S. law leads the judge 
or the judge's successors to forget the latter two understandings. 
The attitude-changing mechanism works in this context because 
of some uncertainty about what exactly hap~ens when a judge 
refers to, but does not rely on, non-U.S. law.5 Successor judges 
mistakenly think that, notwithstanding what the original judges 
said, what they did was rely on non-U.S. law.58 I confess to 
finding this account utterly implausible: The reasons are displayed 
fully when the judge refers to non-US. law, and are fully available 
when the successor judge relies on non-US. law.59 If they are 
rationally persuasive to the original judge, they should be 
rationally persuasive to successor judges.6o And, of course, the 
case against relying on non-US. law collapses without reasons to 
support it, so reaching the bottom of the slippery slope would not 
be indefensible at all. 
To summarize, opponents of the practice of referring to non-
US. law might be concerned that that practice, innocuous in itself, 
portends the adoption of more threatening practices. I have argued 
56. See Volokh, supra note 48, at 1086-88 (discussing the importance of what people 
perceive to be implicit in policy decisions). 
57. See id. at 1065 (discussing situations in which "the justification underlying A is 
vague enough that it could justify B, even if this effect isn't certain"); id. at 1112-
14 (discussing vagueness of legal rules and its implications for slippery slope 
mechanisms). 
58. It may be worth noting that the persistent mischaracterizations in the critical 
literature of what the Court has actually done might actually contribute to this 
later-mistaken assessment. The successor judge might think, "Well, if all these 
smart peoplc arc saying that the Supreme Court actually did rely on non-U.S. 
law, who am I to go against that consensus?" The critical literature might in that 
way help bring about the outcome it seeks to prevent occurring. 
59. Professor Volokh refers to problems of public perceptions about what courts have 
done in these terms: "[P]eople might still interpret a decision as endorsing a 
certain justification even if that's not quite what the decision held, partly because 
many people don't read court decisions very closely or remember them precisely 
(again because of rational ignorance)." [d. at 1090. This point seems clearly 
inapplicable---or, if applicable, extremely weak-in the case of Supreme Court 
Justices. 
60. 1 do not want to press the following point too hard, but I suspect that what drives 
my skepticism is the view that reasons operate differently from attitudes. 
Professor Volokh's discussion is premised, in part, on the assumption that 
successor judges (to use my term) in fact do not find the reasons rationally 
persuasive. See id. at 1069, 1097 (discussing an example that works because the 
successor judges had principles different from those of the original judges). 
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that there seems to be no reason to believe that to be so: If judges 
in the future start relying on non-U.S. law, they will do so not 
because they found it easier to defend doing so given that Justices 
before them referred to non-U.S. law, but because they think there 
are good reasons for doing so. Arguing about the practice of 
referring to non-U.S. law makes no headway with respect to the as-
yet-unadopted practice of relying on non-U.S. law. 
III. CONCLUSION: THE CULTURE WARS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Justice Scalia infamously described one of the Court's decisions 
as an inappropriate intervention in the contemporary culture 
wars.61 The political valence of the controversy of references to 
non-U.S. law strongly suggests that that controversy too is part of 
the culture wars.62 The final question I wish briefly to address here 
is: Why did such a minor practice become one front in the culture 
wars? I divide this in two parts: How does the dispute fit into the 
culture wars, and why did it come to matter as part of the culture 
wars?63 
I doubt that there can be a neutral or objective description of the 
issues in the culture wars, in large part because the combatants 
disagree over how their disagreements should be characterized and 
over whether anything could count as a neutral description. With 
that caution, I here identify two components of the culture wars, 
one limited to the culture wars in the courts, the other applicable 
more broadly. 
Within the courts, the culture wars take the form of disputes 
about constitutional interpretation. Some conservatives believe 
that the sources of constitutional interpretation must be carefully 
limited, while others believe that constitutional interpretation is 
properly an eclectic matter in which all manner of sources can be 
used.64 The former believed-in my view, mistakenly-that they 
had made great headway in disciplining constitutional 
interpretation, and see, in references to non-U.S. law, 
disconfirmation of that belief. They characterize references as 
61. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court 
has mistaken a Kulturkampffor a fit of spite."). 
62. I think it worth observing that refusing to refer to non-U.S. law, at least once the 
possibility has been raised, is as much an intervention in the culture wars as doing 
so. 
63. The premise of this second sub-question is that almost anything can become a 
front in the culture wars, but only some things do. 
64. For a discussion of eclecticism in U.S. constitutional interpretation, see Mark 
Tushnct, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in 
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed. 
2006). 
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reliance to reduce the ensuing cognitive dissonance. We can see 
this phenomenon, I think, in the standard argument that their 
opponents actually recognize that they have lost the domestic 
battle over constitutional interpretation, and so, have turned to non-
U.S. law to make foreigners' views override Americans,.65 
The larger issue in the culture wars, I suggest, is a dispute over 
what it means to be an American patriot.66 For one side, American 
patriotism consists in the celebration of the unique contributions 
the United States has made to the world's prosperity, institutions, 
and ideals. 67 Among those contributions, of course, is the U.S. 
Constitution. For the other side, American patriotism consists in 
celebrating the nation's diversity, its cosmopolitan appreciation of 
what the world's peoples have contributed to the United States, 
and of course, the nation's contributions to the world's prosperity, 
institutions, and ideals. For the first side, making modest reference 
to non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation implicitly 
deprecates the nation's uniqueness. The practice is a form of the 
cosmopolitanism that it finds inconsistent with its version of 
American patriotism. And, the practice suggests that the 
Constitution could be improved from the outside.68 
Another theme in the culture wars is an asserted disagreement 
between those who believe that human experience reflects and 
65. For one articulation of this argument, see Young, supra note 15, at 163 
("Opponents of the death penalty who have striven in vain to persuade their 
fellow Americans to abandon the measure will find more support by extending 
their sphere of argument to take in foreign opinions and practices. "). I think it 
significant that Professor Young uses a case about the juvenile death penalty, 
where the Court did after all find a domestic trend against the practice, to 
illustrate an argument about public support for the death penalty generically. 
66. Compare LARRY SCHWEIKART & MICHAEL PATRICK ALLEN, A PATRIOT'S 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLUMBUS'S GREAT DISCOVERY TO THE 
WAR ON TERROR (2004) (offering a right-wing perspective), with HOWARD ZINN, 
A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT (Harper Perennial 
2003) (1980) (offering a left-wing perspective). I cite these works because of 
what the difference in their titles suggests. 
67. I note as well that in some versions, this vision of patriotism has a xenophobic 
tinge. That is typically not associated with sophisticated conservatives, who are 
sometimes a bit embarrassed about what their allies say. The result, as Eric 
Posner has suggested to me, is that, in his terms, conservative "elites can 
shamefacedly depict the left as unpatriotic, while the left can argue that the right 
is pandering" to its xenophobic allies. E-mail from Eric Posner, Kirkland and 
Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago, to Mark Tushnet, Carmack 
Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
(Nov. 30, 2005) (on file with author). 
68. For some, this position may be supplemented or supported by the view that the 
Constitution is one example of God's intervention in history on behalf of the 
United States. See Alice M. Batchelder, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, Seventh Annual Robert E. Henderson Constitution Day Lecture: 
The Judiciary: Having "neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment"? (Sept. 16, 
2005) (audio recording available at 
hltp:llwww.ashbrook.orglevents/constitutionlbatchelder.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2006». 
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seeks to realize universal values, and those who are said to take a 
more relativistic view. That theme comes out in the present 
context when critics of references to non-U.S. law emphasize that 
legal doctrines are so embedded in a nation's array of culture, 
institutions, and values that one nation's experience is rarely 
relevant to another's problems, to be countered by assertions that 
thoughtful judges around the world are all trying to come up with 
appropriate solutions to problems that are roughly similar.69 What 
is notable here, and what indicates that we are dealing with a 
culture-wars issue, is that in this context those who usually defend 
the idea that there are universal values take the relativists' position. 
There may well be other dimensions of the culture wars 
implicated in this controversy. For example, the "values are 
relative" argument against referring to non-U.S. law may rest, not 
on a rejection of universalism, but a suspicion that the values being 
invoked-sometimes at the urging of transnational human rights 
non-governmental organizations-are not truly universal values 
and might indeed be driven in part by anti-Americanism. Some, 
but not all, of those opposed to the practice of referring to non-U.S. 
law are also opposed to high levels of immigration, legal and 
illegal, into the United States, suggesting that for these opponents 
there might be a substratum of xenophobia to their opposition. 
But, because I am a legal scholar and not a cultural analyst, I am 
uncomfortable speculating further about how the controversy 
considered here fits into the culture wars. 
I tum, then, to my second sub-question: Why did this practice 
become one front in the culture wars? The answer, I think, is that 
the practice was associated with, though not causally connected to, 
a set of decisions themselves part of the culture wars: death 
penalty eases, gay rights cases, and an affirmative action case. I 
am aware that the answer I suggested to the first sub-question 
placed the onus on the conservative side in the culture wars, but in 
partial compensation, perhaps, here my suggested answer puts the 
onus on the liberal side. That is, precisely because the references 
to non-U.S. law are so modest, one can ask Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer why they bothered to insert them, except to 
irritate those on the other side in the culture wars, or perhaps to put 
their opponents in the awkward position of defending the value of 
knowing less rather than knowing more. 
Can anything be done to damp down the controversy, which 
seems rationally indefensible? The problem with the culture wars 
is that once the genie is out of the bottle, it is hard to put it back 
69. For a discussion of these arguments, see Mark Tushnct, When Is Knowing Less 
Beller Than Knowing More?: Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court 
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006). 
312 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
in. 7o That is, once something becomes a front in the culture wars, 
the only way to end the confrontation is for one side to withdraw, 
that is, to accept a loss. That would clearly be true were 
proponents of references to non-U.S. law to stop making such 
references. Perhaps though, opponents of the practice might recast 
their opposition in a way that opens up some common ground. If, 
as I have suggested, their real concerns are with potential 
extensions of the practice, and not with what has already happened, 
they might make that concern clear, allowing those who engage in 
the practice to make clear, in return, that they have no intention to 
extend the practice and indeed would themselves find troubling the 
extensions that trouble their opponents.71 They might start to 
develop criteria explaining their selection of jurisdictions to which 
reference can properly be made, for example.72 But, culture wars 
being what they are, I would not count on this outcome. 
70. That is, one's position on this question is a signal of where one stands on other 
issues. So, even if on reflection a liberal thought it unimportant that the courts 
refer to non-U.S. law, such a liberal would nonetheless refrain from criticizing 
the practice because to do so would be to betray the cause (and similarly for 
conservatives). Again, Eric Posner's comments suggested this elaboration. See 
supra note 67. 
71. In this light, Justice Scalia's comment in Atkins may have been particularly 
unfortunate in converting a practice that might have attracted no attention into a 
front in the culture wars. See supra note 7. 
72. See Tushnet, supra note 69, where I sketch some possibilities along these lines. 
